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Constructing Cost of Living Indexes: Ideas and Individuals, Argentina, 1918-1935 
 
Cecilia T. Lanata Briones1 
Today, price indexes, balance of payments, national income, and unemployment figures are 
elements in the matrix of economic and statistical knowledge used to describe a national 
economy. The idea of the economy as an autonomous system defined by these variables was 
developed between the 1870s and the 1950s (Tooze 2001: 4-11). Due to rising prices, in the 
late 1890s nation-states began to construct weighted price indexes. Increasing urbanization and 
industrialization changed the dynamics of the labor world. The changes needed to be accounted 
for and understood, presenting new informational challenges for national statistical systems 
(Prévost & Beaud 2012: 67). Hence, in their origins price indexes, particularly those that 
measured the cost of living, “helped to stabilize capitalist class relations by providing a 
scientific measure of ‘fair’ wage increases” (Hayes 2011: 99). For price indexes, balance of 
payments, national income, and unemployment figures, World War I was a crucial moment, 
particularly so for price indexes as concern for the social consequences of domestic price rises 
was compounded by the economic disorder triggered by international price volatility. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) explains that before 1914, given slow price 
movements, wages were set through bargaining rather than automatically to reflect changing 
prices. During the war, the situation changed and cost of living indexes (COLIs) became tools 
to adjust long-term contracts, especially wages (ILO 1925: 7-8).2 Since World War II, price 
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indexes, particularly those that measured the cost of living and the fluctuations of consumer 
prices, have economic functions that are dissociated from their earlier social functions, 
influencing their construction as well as the relationship between social classes and the state 
(Hayes 2011: 97).3 
By the 1920s, France (Jany-Catrice 2018; Touchelay 2014 and 2015), Germany (Tooze 
2001), the United Kingdom (O’Neill, Ralph & Smith 2017; Searle 2015), and the United States 
(Stapleford 2009), among other countries, had begun to publish COLIs. COLIs were estimated 
in Argentina, Chile, and Peru as well.4 Argentina stands out because, unlike its Latin American 
counterparts, the weights of the Argentine COLI were based on a household budget survey, 
rather than being a simple average of prices. Hence, the first Argentine COLI was closer to the 
British, German, and U.S. indicators than to its regional peers. However, during the first half 
of the twentieth century the Argentine index had its own characteristics and peculiar trajectory. 
Measuring price changes is particularly relevant in Argentina because since independence the 
country has experienced recurring episodes of inflation (Amaral 1988; Irigoin 2000). The 
behavior of Argentines was affected, generating both interest in price indexes as well as in 
domestic inflation theories. Hence, the Argentine price index is a political statistic that 
addresses a longstanding macroeconomic problem (Daniel & Lanata Briones, 2019, 128). 
 Following the sociology of quantification (Alonso & Starr 1987; Anderson 1988; Curtis 
2001; Desrosières 1993; Hacking 1990; Porter 1995; among others) and the sociology of 
economic knowledge (Fourcade 2009; Furner & Supple 1990; Hayes 2011; among others), this 
paper illustrates the construction and use of statistics through two estimates of the Argentine 
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and Peru (ILR 1927: 123). Most Latin American COLIs were published in the 1930s (IASI 1947: 93, 144, 243, 
301). 
3 
 
COLI. On the one hand, the foundational indicator – named here the Bunge COLI – was 
released privately in 1918 and publicly in 1924. On the other hand, the index published 
officially in 1935 by the National Labor Department (Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, 
DNT), which is named here the DNT COLI. How and why were these two estimates produced 
and how did they differ? In what economic and social context and by whom were they 
elaborated? How does the history of the Argentine index enhance the history of COLIs? In 
answering these questions, this paper contributes to the analysis of the nationally-bounded 
determinants and the importance of individual trajectories in cost of living measurements and 
uses. Moreover, this article enhances the history of COLIs by examining the characteristics, 
ideas, purposes, and uses of two different estimates of the Argentine index within the 
corresponding historical context, focusing on the men behind both estimates, Alejandro 
Ernesto Bunge and José Francisco Figuerola. The paper shows that the Bunge COLI did not 
hold as stable social and political artifact (Desrosières 1993: 9) because it lacked legitimacy in 
the eyes of many sectors of society, most importantly the working class. This was a 
consequence of Bunge’s personal connections, and of the close relationship between the COLI 
and Bunge and between the index and his embryonic macroeconomic vision, which, in 
fostering industrialization, differed from that of the economic and political ruling elite. Thus, 
once Bunge distanced himself from the national statistical system, the index ceased to be 
published between 1925 and 1931. Similar to its counterparts in France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, but in contrast to its predecessor, the DNT COLI’s history 
highlights the importance of the working class as a social actor in fostering the adoption of the 
COLI as industrialization increased. The DNT COLI’s legitimacy was enhanced by the 
connections between the Spaniard Figuerola and the ILO.5 By contrasting the trajectories of 
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the Bunge and DNT COLIs, I argue that the lesson from the history of the Argentine COLI is 
that, for COLIs to hold as stable social and political artifacts during the first half of the twentieth 
century a connection between the COLI and industrial relations had to exist. In particular, the 
COLI contributed towards the formation of the working class as a visible object for policy 
intervention. 
Constructing statistics in Argentina during the first half of the twentieth century 
The existing research on Argentine public statistics mainly examines the period between the 
first (1869) and the fourth (1947) national population censuses. González Bollo (2014) 
conceives of the Argentine national statistical system of that period as the fábrica de las cifras 
oficiales (factory of official figures). He defines the fábrica as a decentralized network of 
statistical agencies that regularly produced numbers. These agencies had dissimilar 
administrative capacities and were located in different ministries. This decentralized character, 
the proliferation of agencies and their lack of coordination was a “normal feature” (Prévost & 
Beaud 2012: 71) of statistical systems at their beginnings. Throughout this period, the fábrica’s 
characteristics and outputs changed substantially, particularly due to the work of Alejandro 
Ernesto Bunge and José Francisco Figuerola. 
Between 1869 and 1898, the fábrica had five agencies. The General Bureau of Statistics 
(Dirección General de Estadísticas de la Nación), the predecessor to today’s National Institute 
of Statistics and Censuses (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos), was founded in 1894. 
In this period, seven national censuses were taken, focusing, for example, on immigration, 
foreign trade, and agriculture. All of these topics related to the ruling elite’s concerns for a 
country endowed with vast and fertile land and little human capital that was entering the world 
economy as an exporter of agricultural products. 
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As the economy diversified and society became more complex, the decentralization of 
statistics was reinforced.6 Between 1900 and 1916-1917, the number of state institutions with 
statistical agencies and total employment within those agencies increased substantially. The 
statistical system improved its internal organization by introducing stable routines. With the 
birth of the social question and the subsequent rise in conflict, urbanization became another 
theme of frequent enquiry. In this period, the decentralized network became a three-story 
building with two agencies at the top, two in the middle and three at the bottom. The offices in 
the top two levels, unlike the rest, were able to maintain a stable routine (González Bollo 2014: 
80-7). The General Bureau of Statistics – situated at the top level of the building – collected 
foreign trade, and public revenue and expenditure figures. The DNT was created in 1907. It 
was a proposal of lawyers, rather than a result of pressures from labor market participants. The 
underlying principle was that the state should intervene in social matters. The aim was to 
understand the situation of the working class in order to legislate. Its Statistics Division – in 
the middle story of the statistical building – was headed by Bunge between 1913 and 1915. 
The division collected information on the prices of working-class consumption goods and 
developed working-class family budget surveys. 
For much of the interwar period, Argentina experienced an expansion of citizen 
participation in politics, rapid economic growth with an increase in the share of manufacturing 
in economic activity, and a subsequent rise in the number of industrial workers.7 Between 
1916-1917 and 1932, public statistics experienced a cognitive and methodological revolution. 
This revolution was linked, partly, to the closure of the Caja de Conversión (1914-1927) – 
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& Rayes 2017: 43). 
7 Between 1918 and 1928, the Argentine economy grew almost as intensely as during the period 1900-1914 
(Gerchunoff & Aguirre 2006: 10). 
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Argentina’s currency board during the Gold Standard era and a crucial piece of the export-
oriented economy. The closure encouraged the construction of statistics to fill the vacuum that 
the new economic context generated. The cognitive and methodological changes also required 
that agencies renew their position in the national statistical system by hiring university students 
and graduates with statistical training. Index numbers were introduced in 1917, and IBM’s 
Hollerith punch-card machines in 1925. As tasks were mechanized, routines became 
increasingly impersonalized and focused throughout the agencies (González Bollo 2014: 123-
125).  
Between 1916-1917 and 1932, the General Bureau of Statistics – headed by Bunge 
between 1916 and 1921 and from 1923 to 1925 – developed price indexes and collected data 
on external trade, public revenue and expenditure, and banking activities. Bunge first 
developed index numbers to establish the prices and quantities of foreign trade (DGEN 1917). 
He also constructed a national income estimate, and cost of living and wholesale price indexes. 
With these statistics, Bunge developed an embryonic macroeconomic vision that favored 
expansive, countercyclical economic policies and highlighted the potential of the domestic 
market (González Bollo 2014: 120). Bunge’s vision differed from that of the prevailing liberal, 
free trade view that aimed at maintaining the agricultural product export-led status quo. 
Throughout the 1930s, the industrial sector had a leading role in the Argentine 
economy, encouraged by exchange controls rather than by active economic policy.8 The 
number of agencies that regulated productive activities multiplied. Declining population 
growth and urbanization, due to the demand created by industrialization, generated significant 
social changes, which fostered public policy. Throughout the period 1932-1943, public 
statistics expanded. From the start of his presidency in 1932, Agustín P. Justo (1932-1938) 
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aimed to normalize the national statistical system (Lanata Briones 2016: 142).9 The 
administrative structure of the statistical offices broadened as they established more sections 
and expanded their geographical and subject coverage. Their permanent staff rose substantially. 
Each agency was in charge of at least one periodically-released measure. Agricultural 
production and its commercialization; the balance of payments; money in circulation; 
wholesale and retail prices; industrial production, employment, and unemployment; and the 
income and purchasing power of the families of urban workers were the most important 
variables. The more refined collection of information portrayed a “standardized, global and 
dynamic economy” (González Bollo 2014: 163, author’s translation). 
The Statistics Division of the DNT was re-launched with the sanction of the law for the 
1932 unemployment census, an increase in its permanent staff, the acquisition of a punch-card 
machine (González Bollo 2014: 207), and the 1932 presidential decree which directed it to 
construct a COLI (BIDNT 1933). In 1934, a presidential decree reorganized the division’s 
tasks, strengthening its technical autonomy (BIDNT 1934b). Also in that year, Figuerola was 
appointed officially as the division’s head. As the government increasingly regulated capital-
labor relationships, the division began to take part as a moderator in those relationships. It 
perfected its statistical research, extended its geographical coverage, and introduced methods, 
concepts, and innovative calculations. The re-launched division began to compile industrial 
statistics, wage and occupation data for several urban areas, information on strikes and 
collective wage agreements, and working-class family budgets for different income levels. This 
data was compiled in the annual publication called Social Investigations (Investigaciones 
Sociales), a compilation of statistics that generated a taxonomy of the Argentine worker. The 
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24.6%, while the DGEN’s dropped by 10.5% (González Bollo 2007: 164). 
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number of reports on different economic sectors grew substantially. Due to this and its 
administrative and intellectual activity, the division and its statistical outputs gained legitimacy 
in the eyes of workers and of workers’ organizations. Official figures gave unions authoritative 
arguments to support their demands, as statistics became a means to prove scientifically the 
workers’ claims (Daniel 2011: 186). Figuerola’s appointment was crucial behind this process. 
Along the lines of Bunge’s embryonic macroeconomic vision, statistics helped Figuerola and 
his team at the division develop that taxonomy as well as ideas that enhanced domestic market 
consumption and, consequently, endorsed industrialization, while relegating to the backburner 
the traditional idea of exporting surplus agricultural production. Together with the statistical 
system, the division evolved and adapted to the changing context. 
Throughout these years, the COLI was an important indicator within the Argentine 
statistical system. It was one of the pillars of Bunge’s embryonic macroeconomic vision in the 
late 1910s and 1920s. It was a tool that provided legitimacy to the Statistics Division of the 
DNT in the 1930s while contributing towards the making of the working class. Moreover, 
Bunge and Figuerola – the men behind the COLI – were key statisticians within the national 
statistical system. Together with the traits mentioned above, these characteristics, explored in 
detail in the following two sections, explain the relevance of the Argentine COLI. 
The Bunge COLI 
In 1918 Alejandro Ernesto Bunge was embedded fully in the Argentine statistical system.10 He 
was then director of the General Bureau of Statistics. The Bunge COLI, the first Argentine 
COLI, was first published that year in the first ever issue of the Review of Argentine Economics 
(Revista de Economía Argentina), a journal founded and edited by Bunge (Bunge 1918). The 
1918 article had annual COLI figures between 1910 and 1917 that were updated by one year 
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in two subsequent journal articles (Bunge 1919; Valle & Ferrari 1920). In 1924, the General 
Bureau of Statistics published the COLI, extending the estimate to 1923 (DGEN 1924). 
Bunge's indicator was constructed with information solely from the City of Buenos Aires and 
not from Argentina as a whole. Bunge had a leading role in the four reports where the COLI 
was published. Thus, between 1918 and 1924 there was a strong association between him and 
the COLI. I argue that this connection not only relates to the fact that he signed and/or 
participated in all articles, but also to his introduction of index numbers to the Argentine 
statistical system in 1917, his centrality within it, and the perception that society at large had 
of Bunge and his statistical activity.11 These connections strongly influenced the early history 
of the Argentine COLI. 
Beginning with his tenure as director of the Statistics Division of the DNT in 1913, 
Bunge aimed to modernize the national statistical system. He believed that the General Bureau 
of Statistics needed to advise the Argentine government and inform the country as, for him, 
statistics enabled “acts to be based on reality” (REA 1923: 248, author’s translation). Hence, 
Bunge conceived of statistics as objective and neutral knowledge. Trained as an engineer in 
Germany, Bunge was exposed to and influenced by the ideas of Friedrich List, who believed 
that nation-states should develop using customs duties to encourage industry (Lucchini et al. 
2000). Just as List interpreted the Napoleonic Wars for Germany, Bunge viewed the setback 
experienced by international trade due to World War I as an opportunity for Argentina to foster 
domestic industry and address its excessive reliance on primary product exports as a source of 
economic growth (Asiain 2014).12 Bunge’s interpretation contradicted the existing economic 
model supported by the liberal political and economic ruling elite. To encourage 
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10 
 
industrialization, Bunge believed that an autonomous economic policy should be established 
(Crovetto & Zeolla 2019: 123). The Caja de Conversión was abandoned in 1914, and the 
changes in the world economy after World War I implied that a new set of phenomena had to 
be understood. Arthur Bowley’s and Irving Fisher’s books led Bunge to conceive the analysis 
of problems through the use of index numbers (Fernández López 1994: 667).13 Just as the 
German Historical School approached the social question empirically using statistics 
(Grimmer-Solem 2003), Bunge developed a domestic market-oriented embryonic 
macroeconomic vision that promoted industrial policy. He based this vision on a set of statistics 
that he introduced to the Argentine statistical system: a national income estimate, foreign trade 
indexes, cost of living and wholesale price indexes, as well as working-class family budget 
surveys. 
During the second half of the 1910s, Argentina, like the rest of the world, was 
experiencing general price rises. The COLI was, for Bunge (1920), the basis for the coefficient 
of correction of the purchasing power of money, a tool to quantify the purchasing power of the 
domestic currency relative to others.14 Using the terminology of the Head of the Statistical 
Section of the ILO, when the objective is to obtain an expression for the fluctuations of the 
purchasing power of money, the COLI falls within the realm of economic statistics (Pribram 
1926: 483). In terms of its uses, in 1920 seven draft laws – which made use of the Bunge COLI 
(Pantaleón 2004: 190) – were presented to freeze real rents. In 1921 the indicator was used in 
an academic paper to justify wage indexation (Prebisch 1921). National deputies designed bills 
to control the rise in the cost of living that were never fully discussed (González Bollo 1999: 
29). The COLI was reproduced in the newspaper La Prensa to explain the increase in the cost 
                                                          
13 On the relationship between Bunge and Fisher, see Fernández López (1994: 671) and Sember (2013: 379). 
14 The coefficient of correction estimates the change in the value of any given good or service during a particular 
period. With the values of the COLI in two periods, one estimates the coefficient. The product of the coefficient 
and the price of the corresponding item today renders the value of such item at a point in the past (Bunge 1920: 
20). 
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of living.15 In Neiburg’s words (2006: 614), the Bunge COLI portrayed the double nature of 
these indexes by describing previous empirical events and by trying to prescribe future 
behavior. 
Bunge’s statistical work was endorsed nationally. The Dean of the School of Economic 
Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires, where Bunge was a statistics professor, publically 
praised the 1918 journal article that released the COLI and asked Bunge to extend the results 
with student help (REA 1919a). La Nación and La Prensa, Argentine newspapers aligned with 
the ruling elite’s interests, published his articles and op-eds. The Buenos Aires Herald, an 
Argentine newspaper published in English, was also positive about Bunge’s publications 
(González Bollo 2004: 64), and both it and the U.S. consulate in Argentina were optimistic 
about Bunge’s return to the General Bureau of Statistics in 1923 (González Bollo 2012: 76). 
The 1919 National Economic Conference, sponsored by the Argentine Confederation of 
Commerce, Industry and Production (Confederación Argentina de Comercio, Industria y 
Producción), demanded an expansion of the General Bureau of Statistics when the Bureau was 
directed by Bunge (REA 1919b: 485). 
 Nevertheless, praise for Bunge’s COLI did not extend across Argentine society as a 
whole. Within Argentina, Bunge’s beliefs and social position, his connections with the 
economic establishment and the rumor of a hidden agenda influenced the perception that some 
sectors had of the information he produced. Why? Due to his upbringing and family history, 
Bunge was part of the ruling establishment (González Bollo 2004). Since he distanced himself 
from left-wing ideologies and believed that the social improvements of the Radical Party 
governments (1916-1930) had only partisan political purposes, he was politically conservative 
(Asiain 2014: 83). Bunge preached his new macroeconomic stance in the pages of the Review 
                                                          
15 “La carestía de la vida. Sus causas y consecuencias.” La Prensa, April 27, 1919, 8. 
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of Argentine Economics. His economic journal was the leading voice in the contemporary 
debate on “development strategies and economic policies capable of returning the country to 
the economic dynamism lost during World War I” (Llach 1985: 52, author’s translation). 
Financed by official and private advertising, the journal’s research was grounded on public and 
private statistics (Pantaleón 2004: 185). In 1921 the composition of the journal’s editorial board 
changed, bringing in members who had closer connections with establishment associations, 
such as the Argentine Industrial Union (Unión Industrial Argentina) and the Argentine Rural 
Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina). It also increasingly supported the ideas of the Argentine 
Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Production, which represented the interests of the 
United States and of domestic industry. Pantaleón (2004: 185-9) argues that the journal was 
the base of Bunge’s network. According to Belini (2006: 31), it spoke for the Industrial Union 
and the major domestic economic groups. Though relevant and economically important, these 
links were not all with the political and economic ruling elite, but with groups that antagonized 
it. Whilst being Director of the General Bureau of Statistics, Bunge joined the boards of 
directors of different firms. He was, at one and the same time, a bureaucrat and a representative 
of outside interests. In the 1920 parliamentary discussion of the General Bureau of Statistics’ 
budget, Socialist representative Nicolás Repetto denounced a “scam” (González Bollo 2014: 
141, author’s translation). Repetto claimed that Bunge’s journal was using the General Bureau 
of Statistics’ best and most loyal employees to first publish data in newspapers as a scoop, then 
release it in the journal, and lastly in the General Bureau of Statistics’ yearbooks.  
Moreover, the working class associated Bunge with the COLI and distrusted both. 
Socialist organizations – one of the three strands of the Argentine labor movement – doubted 
Bunge's statistics since he arrived at the Statistics Division in 1913. They claimed that Bunge’s 
statistics lacked “real and tangible empirical basis” because they were developed by an 
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“accomplished theologian of arithmetic science”.16 That is, these organizations believed that 
Bunge's numbers were tainted by his strong religious beliefs – which were widely known 
throughout society as Bunge did not hide them (González Bollo 2012: 33) – because, for them, 
they did not match reality. They argued that the lack of information on how data was collected 
implied a lack of honesty in their gathering, while accusing Bunge of using his position at the 
statistical agency to play politics in a “cynical and disloyal” way.17 In 1925 and 1926 the 
newspaper Bandera Proletaria, of revolutionary syndicalist extraction – another strand within 
the labor movement – questioned the prices collected and used to construct the COLI.18 An 
article in La Vanguardia, the Socialist newspaper, criticized and doubted origins of the prices 
used to estimate the Bunge COLI. It compared them with another set of prices that showed 
much higher yearly increases. Consequently, the article claimed that the rise in the cost of 
living cannot be “resolved with mathematical formulas or just by doing estimates on paper.”19 
Initially, the Bunge COLI was published privately – rather than by the national 
statistical system – in a journal linked to specific interests, and it was constantly associated 
with one individual. The political and economic elite as well as the working class condemned 
Bunge’s statistical work, undermining it. The Bunge COLI is an example of how numbers not 
generated by statistical agencies and linked to particular organizations may be accepted, but 
are more likely to be viewed skeptically (Porter 1995: 214). The distrust placed in the COLI 
arose from a questioning of Bunge, rather than a specific methodological criticism. 
 Despite the domestic disapproval, the Bunge COLI travelled quickly outside 
Argentina’s borders, thanks to the relationships Bunge established when disseminating the 
                                                          
16 “La última estadística sobre la desocupación obrera.” La Vanguardia, December 13, 1913, 1, author’s 
translation. 
17 Ibid., 1, author’s translation. 
18 “El valor de una estadística.” Bandera Proletaria, July 17, 1926, 1. 
19 “Por el abaratamiento de la vida.” La Vanguardia, September 14, 1919, 6, author’s translation. 
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COLI (REA 1920a; REA 1920b; REA 1920c). In 1924 the journal of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) published it (MLS 1924: 39). The Encyclopaedia Britannica 1921 cost of 
living entry written by Arthur Bowley referenced it when it referred to “occasional calculations 
[of COLIs] on a similar basis” to that of the United Kingdom and the United States, among 
others (LSE, COLL MISC 0772, B6). In The Making of Index Numbers, Irving Fisher’s (1922, 
433) list on index numbers quoted Bunge’s index. Many authors highlight Bunge’s 
international connections (De Imaz 1974: 548; Daniel 2012: 74; Pantaleón 2004: 190). Their 
claims are based on the information published by Bunge himself since he alleged that he 
corresponded via post with these individuals and associations. The references listed here, by 
contrast, are findings that are independent of Bunge’s claims. They unequivocally prove that 
Bunge experienced unprecedented international acknowledgment (Pantaleón 2009: 60). The 
COLI transcended the domestic arena without reaching the ILO because Bunge deliberately 
cultivated ties with certain international scholars. Thus, the COLI’s international recognition 
was hindered. Specifically, from the perspective of the international standardization of socio-
labor statistics fostered by the ILO, Argentina was an outcast in this period. In search for 
international validation, Bunge compared the evolution and values of the Argentine COLI with 
the estimates from other European and North American countries (DGEN 1924: 2). Such an 
association presented an Argentina that was directly comparable with other countries since it 
had the same statistics as them, contributing to its configuration as a modern nation-state, as 
also happened with population censuses (Loveman 2014). The comparison between COLIs 
aimed to provide legitimacy to the Argentine index by portraying its objectivity. The Bunge 
COLI was needed to compare the domestic situation with international trends rather than due 
to local needs. 
The close relationship between the COLI and Bunge influenced the index’s lack of 
publication between 1925 and 1931, which for González Bollo (2014: 139) was a consequence 
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of the economic prosperity of the 1920s that weakened the COLI’s political and social impact. 
Since personal credibility is required to produce numbers (Porter 1995: 214), the lack of 
legitimacy of the index also relates to the close relationship between Bunge and the COLI and 
the role the indicator had in his macroeconomic vision. In June 1925 Bunge resigned as Head 
of the General Bureau of Statistics because he “considered that the reorganization of national 
statistics is completed” (REA 1925: 463, author’s translation). He never had another relevant 
post within the national statistical system. Moreover, the monetary ‘normality’ restored in 1927 
when the Caja de Conversión was re-established undermined the relevance of the coefficient 
of money correction (Lanata Briones 2016: 119). Lastly, in 1928 President Yrigoyen fired the 
Director of the General Bureau of Statistics, delaying the publication of the foreign trade index 
numbers. These indexes, initially elaborated by Bunge, were trusted because they were needed 
to measure the dynamism of the export-led economy. Foreign trade index numbers were more 
important than the COLI as the ruling class benefited from the export-led model. Hence, the 
lack of publication of the COLI also implies that the index had no clear use within the existing 
political economy. 
 Despite the trajectory of the COLI, Bunge was a symbol of the new group of Argentine 
statisticians that rose to prominence in the interwar period. According to the categorization of 
Prévost and Beaud (2012: 6), Bunge was a polymath: he was a state statistician who also had 
scholarly credentials. He provided a legitimate definition of statistical activity and a way of 
working that gave a sense of objectivity and neutrality to his actions (Daniel 2012: 65-80). 
Bunge adapted international norms to the existing data and/or to the Argentine situation and its 
constraints (Lanata Briones forthcoming). We can say that Bunge contributed to developing 
economic knowledge under particular situations, particularly in the form of index numbers, 
and transformed the local scientific field (Fourcade 2009: 258). 
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 The existing political, economic, social and intellectual context influenced Bunge’s 
concerns and statistical developments. Despite his knowledge and contributions to the national 
statistical system, Bunge was “unambiguously associated with both conservative politics and 
economic renovation” (Falcoff 1982: 40). The Bunge COLI was part of a toolbox of statistics 
used to develop an embryonic macroeconomic vision that differed from the existing export-
oriented and outward-looking consensus in that it sought to enhance industrialization and the 
domestic market. Argentina’s social, political and economic elite did not back Bunge’s vision 
and was hostile to his COLI. The COLI was distrusted also by the working class. Unlike other 
statistics produced by Bunge, the COLI did not have a role within the Argentine political 
economy of the 1910s and 1920s. The novelty of Bunge’s views and of the COLI overwhelmed 
many of his contemporaries, who were unwilling to read or prioritize “topics and reports based 
on facts and figures” (De Imaz 1974: 548, author’s translation). The close association between 
Bunge and the COLI influenced the index’s history, from its launch in 1918 to its lack of 
publication between 1925 and 1931. 
The DNT COLI 
When taking office in 1932, President Justo aimed to normalize the functioning of the national 
statistical system following the events of 1928-1931, which included the lack of publication of 
the COLI, the sacking of the heads of two statistical agencies, and budgetary cuts for statistical 
agencies. In September 1932 a presidential decree argued for the need to know the fluctuations 
in the purchasing power of workers' wages and established the construction of a COLI (BIDNT 
1933). The task was assigned to the Statistics Division of the DNT and to José Francisco 
Figuerola.20 The COLI, named here the DNT COLI, was released in 1935 (DNT 1935) and it 
was updated monthly. Like its predecessor, it was constructed with information solely of the 
                                                          
20 Figuerola was born in Barcelona in August 1897 and died in Buenos Aires in September 1970. 
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City of Buenos Aires. I argue that, due to the work of the Statistics Division and Figuerola, the 
perception of the COLI, specifically by the working class, as well as its objective and use 
changed, providing legitimacy to the index. 
From the end of the 1920s, the Statistics Division began to realize the potential wages 
had to consume local production. The “imperative need” to “quickly reach the knowledge of 
economic and social facts” to solve the problems between capital and labor encouraged the 
presidential decree of October 1934 that reorganized the division’s tasks (BIDNT 1934b: 4032, 
author’s translation), another piece in Justo’s normalization of the statistical system. The decree 
conceived of statistics as a neutral and objective descriptor of reality. That year, Figuerola was 
named Head of the Statistics Division. The rationale of Justo's project was outlined in the 
prologue of the 1935 report that released the DNT COLI, where it was claimed that “social 
justice is highly dependent on the good understanding” of the living conditions of workers and 
their relations with employers (DNT 1935: 3, author’s translation). The prologue also 
highlighted that all acts of government must have a justification and must be based on the 
knowledge of facts. Despite Bunge’s embryonic macroeconomic vision, the agricultural export 
model was still backed by the economic and political ruling elite. However, increasing 
urbanization and industrialization required the building of a new image of the nation where its 
key protagonist, the working class, needed to be made with the help of statistics (Hacking 1990: 
5-6). With the 1932 and 1934 presidential decrees, the statistical making of the working class 
became a state matter. This production of statistical knowledge facilitated the social control of 
that sub-population, as knowledge was the first step towards establishing evidence-based 
policy to encourage or enforce certain behaviors (González Bollo 2007: 238; Hacking 1990: 
108). These changes generated a boom in the production of socio-labor statistics and 
contributed to the legitimacy of the COLI.  
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Unlike Bunge, Figuerola – a doctor of law and an expert on labor issues – was a Spanish 
native who needed to make an impression when he moved to Argentina in 1930. During the 
dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, he was Secretary General of the Cataluña delegation 
of the Spanish Labor Ministry under Eduardo Aunós Pérez.21  Despite not being an official 
delegate to the ILO’s statistical meetings or to any International Labor Conference, Figuerola 
became aware of the ILO’s legal and statistical practices and guidelines (ILO, C 2-2-1; ILO, 
CAT 5-8-4; ILO, T 102/0/2). This provided him with knowledge of the labor world, political 
capital and legitimacy of having experienced a government position (González Bollo 2002: 
14). Figuerola taught labor and corporate law at the Barcelona Social School, where Aunós 
Pérez also lectured.22 When the dictatorship fell, Figuerola took a job as legal advisor for the 
Hispano-American Electric Company (Compañía Hispanoamericana de Electricidad) in 
Buenos Aires. He became the company's representative to the DNT and due to his “efficient 
and brilliant” performance he was invited to join the department (Delgado 1994: 413, author’s 
translation). A 1932 presidential decree put him in charge of the COLI, and that year he 
conducted the unemployment census. Figuerola acted as a state statistician (Prévost & Beaud 
2012: 6) before being officially named Head of the Statistics Division of the DNT, which 
occurred in September 1934 (BIDNT 1934a: 4035). Unlike Bunge, Figuerola’s recognition 
arose mainly from his bureaucratic activities rather than his academic credentials. He imparted 
a corporativist ideology on the division’s work, helped by his stable team and by the 
introduction of the ILO’s statistical guidelines. 
As part of a new phase in the relationship between the organization and Latin America 
that started in 1930 (Yáñez Andrade 2012: 34), the ILO increased its influence in Argentina 
through the appointment of Raúl Migone as the first ILO correspondent in the country in 1931. 
                                                          
21 “Comida íntima.” La Vanguardia, November 29, 1927, 10. 
22 “Escuela Social de Barcelona. Exámenes.” La Vanguardia, October 22, 1929, 7. 
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The relationship between Figuerola and Migone played a decisive role in Figuerola’s career. 
They met in April 1931 at the First National Labor Congress held in Buenos Aires (ILO, C 2-
2-1). Figuerola pursued the relationship with Migone by preparing a dossier for him to send to 
the ILO and a report on Argentine social policy (ILO, CAT 5-8-3; ILO, CAT 5-8-6). After ILO 
Director Albert Thomas’ vague proposal to create an ILO branch in Argentina (ILO, C 2202/2), 
Figuerola and Migone designed and submitted an outline that contained a description of the 
branch’s tasks and costs with Migone as Director and Figuerola as Secretary. An assistant 
would prepare information on wages, cost of living and family budgets (ILO, CAT 5-8-4). The 
plan was outlined in March 1932, before the COLI became a government project. Since the 
proposal focused on numbers not systematically gathered by it, Figuerola was well aware of 
the data produced by the Statistics Division. Figuerola’s efforts paid off because, according to 
Migone, it was thanks to his negotiation with his friend and then President of the DNT, Eduardo 
Bullrich, that Figuerola was offered the leadership of the Statistics Division in April 1932 (ILO, 
CAT 5-8-4), five months before the COLI decree and two years before being officially named 
as Head of the statistical agency. Figuerola also corresponded with the then Head of the 
Statistical Section of the ILO John Nixon in 1935 and 1936, where Figuerola referred to 
Migone as his “friend” (ILO, T 102/0/2). Figuerola was well aware of the legitimacy a link 
with the labor organization provided him.23 Moreover, before mentioning the idea of social 
justice in the 1935 report, the DNT argued that the 1934 reorganization of the division's tasks 
crystallized in that year's decree followed the developments in the methods of study of the labor 
world, an indirect reference to the ILO. Such a diagnosis related to Figuerola’s acquaintance 
with Migone and his previous knowledge of the ILO’s work. The increasing influence of the 
                                                          
23 Figuerola asked Albert Thomas for permission to mention ILO members and publish a photo of the Geneva 
office in his journal, Revista de Derecho Social (ILO, CAT 5-8-6). In 1932 Migone and Figuerola lobbied for a 
subsidy from the DNT that would enable the Revista to publish ILO data for free (ILO, CAT 5-8-4). 
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ILO in Argentina also enhances the idea of the importance gained by the working class for the 
Argentine government. 
 Figuerola conceived of socio-labor statistics as those that allow an analysis of the 
standard of living of social groups. For him the COLI was a mathematical tool that showed the 
variations of working-class family incomes (Figuerola 1942: 265-8). It was one of the statistical 
tools needed for the statistical making of the working class. In contrast to its predecessor, the 
DNT COLI was estimated due to domestic social policy needs. Using the terminology of the 
Head of the Statistical Section of the ILO, when its objective is to determine the level of real 
wages and to be used as a basis for adjusting wages to changes in the value of money, the COLI 
falls within the realm of labor statistics (Pribram 1926: 483). For the General Confederation of 
Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo), the national trade union federation, the index 
shaped the objective judgments needed to legislate; they conceived of it as an “instrument to 
measure poverty”.24 In 1934 the COLI allowed civil court judges to implement index-adjusted 
severance pay (González Bollo 2014: 173). The following year, the Federation of Garment 
Workers (Federación Obrera del Vestido) used it to update wages.25 Meanwhile, the labor 
confederation employed it to validate its strike decisions.26 In the wake of the 1937-1938 
economic contraction, the COLI was used to justify the need to improve workers’ situation.27 
In early 1942 manufacturers in the metal sector compared the 13% rise in the COLI to the 
19.5% increase in wages to undermine the workers’ claim that the purchasing power of their 
wages was deteriorating (Daniel 2011: 193). In 1943 Figuerola designed a scheme to index 
wages to the fluctuations in the COLI (DNT 1943). Like its predecessor, the DNT COLI 
described and prescribed, though its prescriptive nature was enhanced. 
                                                          
24 “La carestía de la vida en la Capital Federal.” CGT, November 16, 1934, 3, author’s translation. 
25 “Mitin contra la carestía de la vida y la reacción.” CGT, October 18, 1935, 4. 
26 “Contra la carestía de la vida la reducción de la jornada.” CGT, October 18, 1935, 1. 
27 “Una realidad sombría.” CGT, September 17, 1937, 1. 
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 The DNT COLI had to overcome the doubts regarding its predecessor. The labor 
confederation endorsed the DNT COLI from the start, stating that the DNT’s work to construct 
the COLI was carried out “without preconceptions and following a rigorous and predetermined 
method”. For the national trade union federation, the household budget survey on which the 
index was based was “thorough” and the results “objective”,28 while the COLI provided 
“scientific proof” of workers’ needs.29 The role played by the labor confederation suggests that 
a network of actors is necessary to help in the diffusion of a COLI (Desrosières 2014: 357). 
However, there were still criticisms. Migone’s reports to the ILO claimed that the index was 
criticized by newspapers (ILO, C 2-2-1). He mentioned that Socialist newspaper La 
Vanguardia questioned the correctness of the numbers that it reported and methodology early 
on, saying that the cost of living had not declined between 1933 and 1935 (ILO, C 2-2-1). A 
review of the report where the DNT COLI was released compared the official results with the 
figures obtained by the Railway Union (Unión Ferroviaria). It questioned that the index was 
based on the weights reflecting consumption patterns of the lowest-earning household and that 
it excluded certain goods. Nevertheless, the piece claimed that the launch of the COLI would 
encourage analysis and future research (Mestorino 1935). A study from a magazine related to 
the financial and industrial sectors asserted that the lack of inclusion of several goods led to a 
superficial index that if used to design laws and economic policy could become “disastrous for 
humble households”.30 The fact that the COLI was associated with the DNT as an institution 
rather than with Figuerola as an individual, contributed to its legitimacy. Unlike Bunge, 
Figuerola’s name did not appear in the division’s reports even if he wrote them. Due to the 
endorsement of the labor confederation, the DNT COLI was accepted by the working class. In 
                                                          
28 “Algo de lo que enseña la estadística sobre el costo de la vida en la Capital Federal.” CGT, May 3, 1935, 4, 
author’s translation. 
29 “El salario mínimo y el costo de la vida.” CGT, January 4, 1935, 1, author’s translation. 
30 “Estadística equivocada.” Véritas, December 15, 1936, 25, author’s translation. 
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Porter’s terms, it began to give “direction to the very activities that are being measured” (1995: 
45). The Statistics Division’s socio-labor statistics made individuals governable. The DNT 
COLI, in comparison to the Bunge COLI, was trusted. It held as a stable social and political 
artifact, and with it public policy was designed to consider and benefit the working class. 
 In February 1935 Migone sent the DNT report where the COLI was launched to the 
ILO (ILO, T 102/0/2). Hence, the labor organization was able to publish the DNT COLI in the 
May 1935 issue of the International Labour Review. The BLS commented on that report a few 
months after (MLS 1935: 850). These references are an endorsement of the DNT COLI, giving 
it and Figuerola’s work international recognition. This acknowledgment and approval surged 
from organizations linked to socio-labor statistics because Figuerola had an interest in being 
acknowledged by them. This must be understood in the wider context of the change in the 
relationship between Argentina and the ILO, Figuerola’s aim to legitimize himself and his 
work, and the importance he placed on the ILO. 
 The DNT’s report where the COLI was launched stated that, apart from the 1924 
publication of the General Bureau of Statistics (where the Bunge COLI was published by the 
national statistical system), there was no regular series with uniform data to determine a long-
term estimate of the cost of living. The report claimed that, with the DNT COLI, the vacuum 
had ceased to exist. The methodology of the DNT COLI followed openly the resolutions of the 
second and third International Conferences of Labor Statisticians of the ILO that discussed 
COLIs and family budget surveys. The Statistics Division aimed to develop a COLI worthy of 
comparison to its international equivalents. The division relied on the authority of the ILO's 
statistical conferences to validate its proceedings. The presidential decree of 1932 that 
encouraged the construction of the COLI, the reference to internationally accepted 
methodology, the little importance given to previous estimates, and the assertion that the work 
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carried out by the Statistics Division was successful sent the message that the DNT COLI was 
something new and a greatly improved version of its predecessor. Aware of the international 
and national standards and developments, Figuerola was an important asset within the Statistics 
Division. Similar to Bunge, Figuerola adopted and adapted international guidelines to the local 
context and circumstances, contributing to the construction of COLIs and economic 
knowledge. 
 Figuerola arrived in Argentina with experience as a civil servant and knowledge of the 
international status quo of socio-labor statistics. Figuerola’s awareness of the ILO’s increasing 
relevance and his acquaintance with the contents of its statistical conferences influenced his 
trajectory as Head of the Statistics Division, the history of this Argentine statistical agency, 
and the history of the Argentine COLI. Figuerola, like Bunge, believed in the neutrality and 
objectivity of numbers, as facts that mirrored reality. Under his tenure, the Statistics Division 
became a regular collector of information on the working class. As manufacturing industry 
increased its share of gross domestic product, this quantitative information was part of the 
greater aim of making the working class a social and economic actor, helping to construct a 
new image of the Argentine nation. Building on Bunge’s statistical work and his embryonic 
macroeconomic vision, socio-labor information helped develop solid arguments about the 
advantages of providing greater purchasing power to wages as a pillar of an expansionary 
economic policy. The DNT COLI became a crucial indicator to establish workers’ purchasing 
power, as information on wages was not gathered as systematically. Hence, the elaboration of 
the DNT COLI, unlike Bunge's index, was encouraged by a presidential decree. The DNT 
COLI had an administrative/government purpose and objectives; it was an act of government, 
rather than a mathematical construction linked to private and individual interests. The index 
became a legitimate and trusted source of political dispute and a basis of objectivity for 
discourse. The DNT COLI held as a stable social and political artifact because it corresponded 
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with the new ways of thinking, organizing and shaping social relations. It also found a network 
of allies to diffuse it. These two dimensions correspond to Desrosières’ (2014: 355) macro-
historical and micro-sociological dimensions in the analysis of statistics. 
The Argentine COLI vis-à-vis its counterparts: shedding light on the history of 
COLIs 
This section provides an analysis of the context, ideas and uses of the Argentine, British, 
French, German, and U.S. COLIs during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly the 
interwar period, with the aim to shed light on the history of COLIs more broadly.31 The 
comparison is based on existing research on the British (Searle 2015), French (Touchelay 2014; 
2015), German (Tooze 2001), and U.S. (Stapleford 2009) indexes. I argue that the contrast 
among these COLIs enhances the idea that for COLIs to hold as stable social and political 
artifacts (Desrosières 1993: 9) they have to have a role within the political economy and that, 
more importantly, in the first half of the twentieth century such role was closely related to their 
use as wage adjustment mechanisms. In this process, approval, support and compliance from 
the working class were crucial. 
 By the 1920s, Argentina, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
had released COLIs. In their origins, these indexes were related to World War I, proving how 
moments of distress advance economic knowledge (Furner & Supple 1990: 24). However, the 
link between the indexes and the war varied, depending on the way in which the conflict 
affected each country. The British and U.S. COLIs achieved significance during the conflict, 
as these countries were among the belligerents. In Argentina and Germany, despite the latter 
being involved directly in the war, they gained importance after it, in large part due to the way 
                                                          
31 Comparisons regarding the different COLIs methodology and characteristics are found in Lanata Briones (2016: 
207-20). 
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the conflict altered each nation. In Germany, war reparations triggered hyperinflation that 
generated a demand for a frequently updated index. World War I modified the international 
political economy, so the context in which Argentina’s economic and political ruling elite 
planned to develop its activities changed and a new reality had to be understood. The effect the 
international conflict had on these indicators confirms the importance of World War I for the 
history of COLIs. 
 In Britain, Germany, and the United States, COLIs were initially wage adjustment 
mechanisms. They shed light on the social question that was leading to increasing industrial 
unrest. Wages were not adjusted simply to the conditions of an industry, but tied to the cost of 
living (Hayes 2011: 102). COLIs were produced due to the demands of organized labor. In 
France, the price index was initially published to calm the anger of housewives who 
complained about price increases (Touchelay 2015: 136).32 These indexes were developed 
because of domestic needs in highly industrialized countries. However, at that time, they were 
not a priority for statistical systems. For example, their relevance in Britain and the United 
States faded once World War I was over (Searle 2015: 149-150; Stapleford 2009: 11-12). 
Despite the similarities in their use, they were elaborated by different agencies: the British 
COLI by the Labour Bureau of the Board of Trade; in the United States by the BLS; the French 
index by Statistique Générale de la France (the country’s statistical agency at the time); and 
in Germany through joint efforts of the Reich Statistical Office and the Labor Ministry. This 
reflected the differences in the characteristics of the national statistical systems and thus the 
needs of society and the state. As Stapleford (2009: 76) explains, data on prices in the United 
States began to be published when the BLS realized its role as monitor and facilitator of 
industrial relations. This function and the relevance of the COLI gained significance as time 
                                                          
32 Wage adjustment in France was determined at a regional level at that time. Thus, the price index was not used 
for this purpose (Touchelay 2014: 120). 
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passed. For Touchelay (2014: 120), the French price index became more relevant once price 
and wage policy was nationalized. On the other hand, Argentina, a country that in the 1910s 
and 1920s was scarcely industrialized, needed statistical instruments to understand and make 
governable the changing economic situation, leading, in turn, to an embryonic macroeconomic 
vision that enhanced the role of national industry. However, as the reader can recall, Bunge’s 
claim for industrialization was not shared by the political and economic ruling elite, who aimed 
at maintaining the outward-looking, export-led economic strategy pursued since the 1880s. 
Economic knowledge is constructed upon and contributes to produce representations “about 
social organization, legitimate governance practices, and understandings of national identity” 
(Fourcade 2009: 20). These views have to be widely shared across society for the elements of 
this knowledge to be perceived as legitimate and to hold as stable social and political artifacts, 
something that did not happen with the Bunge COLI. Wage adjustment and the social question 
were crucial in the design and trajectory of the DNT COLI. In fact, the idea of the DNT as 
mediator between capital and labor appeared in the prologue of the report where the DNT COLI 
was published. As suggested, this related in part to the changing relationship between 
Argentina and the ILO that began in the 1930s, but mainly it was a consequence of increasing 
urbanization, industrialization and, consequently, the existence of a working class that could 
articulate its demands through the labor confederation, which supported and diffused the COLI 
from the start. The DNT COLI was developed to deal with domestic matters. 
 With respect to the periodization of the COLIs, the Argentine index followed a similar 
path to its counterparts from Germany and the United States. While World War I provided an 
initial boost, the changes triggered by the Great Depression were the major turning point in the 
history of the indexes, although with national nuances. In all cases, the Depression was an 
essential prelude to the index’s role as a fundamental variable in economic analyses. The 
Argentine DNT and its Statistics Division gained substantial importance during the 1930s, 
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particularly in comparison to previous years. Unlike the BLS (Stapleford 2009: 149, 167-9), 
the DNT was still at that time a “closed stronghold” that collected statistics (Fayt 1967: 96, 
author’s translation). Tooze (2001: 153-4) suggests that the German Reichsindex, affected by 
the shifts that the German statistical system experienced in the 1930s, was able to withstand 
the criticisms that had previously been a weakening factor. There were substantial differences 
between the two periods, however. Before the turning point, the idea of cost of living generally 
implied studying family expenditures and living conditions, which resulted in fairly simple 
indexes where food items predominated (Stapleford 2009: 69). Their elaboration and regular 
update were subject to the availability of financial resources (Touchelay 2015: 136). In 
Germany and the United States, from the 1930s onwards, COLIs gained a more economic 
meaning linked to the under-consumption argument. In Argentina in the 1930s, the study of 
family expenditures and living conditions was reinforced. Since there was insufficient pressure 
for a rule-governed system to regulate wages, the index became a well-established indexation 
mechanism with the same scope as in other countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Daniel & Lanata 
Briones 2019: 132). 
 Stapleford demonstrates that theoretical and academic discussions about the 
significance of COLIs intensified after World War I, mainly in Britain and in the United States. 
The debate, which heavily influenced both indexes, was triggered by the increasing financial 
implications that COLIs had in arbitration and collective bargaining agreements, and to the 
changes in consumption patterns generated by conflict (Stapleford 2009: 99-118; Searle 2015: 
151). Bunge and Figuerola adopted concepts, knowledge and practices from the international 
arena and adapted them to the local context and to their own understanding of the Argentine 
situation. Debate on how to produce COLIs was absent in Argentina at this time. Even practical 
discussions did not take place (Lanata Briones 2016: 213). Figuerola was aware of the 
importance the ILO was attaining and included its guidelines to legitimize all his statistical 
28 
 
work at the Statistics Division. Hence, Argentina incorporated ILO vocabulary in its reports, 
which seems to be less relevant in Britain and the United States. These two countries focused 
much more on internal discussions. However, Argentina always aimed, at least in its discourse, 
to generate standardized statistics. Thus, despite international developments, national context 
and particular individuals’ aims and knowledge influenced economic knowledge in general and 
the history of national COLIs in particular. 
In its origins, the Argentine COLI had a different initial trajectory vis-à-vis its 
counterparts from Western Europe and the United States. This trajectory suggests that for 
COLIs to hold as stable social and political artifacts they have to have a clear function within 
the political economy (Stapleford 2009: 60). In the first half of the twentieth century, COLIs 
were wage adjustment mechanisms, while state agencies were mediators between capital and 
labor. Early in their history, COLIs had to be perceived as a neutral and objective means to 
foster the rationalization of labor relations. As individuals recognize and define themselves 
through figures (Hacking 1990: 3-6), approval, support and compliance from the working class 
was crucial. A political space that generates a space of common measurement must be created, 
to make things that hold as stable social and political artifacts (Desrosières 1993: 9). In their 
beginnings, COLIs that held were closely related to the working class. As the Argentine case 
study shows, COLIs were a key instrument in the making of the working class. The analysis of 
the two Argentine indexes and the comparison with its counterparts also implies that, 
consequently, they must have been triggered by domestic, rather than international, needs. 
Conclusion 
In their origins, COLIs were designed according to the availability of data, the aims set by their 
designers, the context in which they were produced, their expected uses, and political and 
practical decisions. Going beyond the valuable insights of Searle, Touchelay, Tooze, and 
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Stapleford for the British, French, German, and U.S. COLIs, this article analyzed the ideas and 
objectives of the men behind the first two Argentine COLIs with the aim to enhance the existing 
knowledge on the history of COLIs more generally and Argentina’s in particular. The general 
contribution follows Fourcade’s (2009: 14) idea that understanding how economic knowledge 
was initially organized is crucial to comprehend long-term trajectories. The particular 
contribution is of relevance considering the importance the indicator has within Argentina, and 
the recent questionings the index has experienced.33 This enhances Jerven’s (2014: 4) notion 
that examining the origins of statistics is of great importance to understand current trends. 
The analysis of public statistics generates knowledge of the political economy and 
depicts how states changed over time (Jerven 2014: 4). Until 1932, Argentine public statistics 
standardized demographic, economic and socio-labor indicators providing evidence to the 
ruling elite in order to sustain agricultural export-led growth. Several changes occurred in the 
1930s, fostered by urbanization, industrialization and an increasing presence of the state within 
the economy. The documentation of the worker was deepened, rendering a representation of 
an empirical worker, and making the Argentine industrial working class. Within the fábrica, 
tasks, capacities and objectives adapted to the changing social, political and economic context 
to generate economic and statistical knowledge (Fourcade 2009). 
From the outset, the first two estimates of the Argentine COLI were worthy of 
comparison to others largely due to the indexes' traits as well as the knowledge and aims of the 
statisticians that constructed it. This paper depicts how the two Argentine COLIs had both 
similar and unique characteristics when contrasted to international counterparts at different 
points in time. There is no doubt that economic knowledge had distinctive trajectories in each 
country. Alejandro Ernesto Bunge conceived of the economy as a national entity and believed 
                                                          
33 Between 2007 and 2015, the official price index ceased to be the sole reference of Argentina’s inflation (Daniel 
& Lanata Briones 2019). 
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that facts, which can take the form of statistics, were needed to analyze the economy and 
develop policy recommendations. He knew that he needed a statistical toolbox to portray and 
convey his ideas. However, his vision about how the scarcely industrialized Argentine 
economy should function differed greatly from that of the political and economic ruling elite. 
Because of this and also due to his personal connections, the Bunge COLI did not hold as a 
stable artifact and ceased to be published for several years. The DNT COLI, on the other hand, 
contributed toward the statistical making of the working class, and its trajectory was influenced 
by the connections between the Spaniard Figuerola and the ILO. The idea set out in the report 
where the DNT COLI was published was that the index should contribute towards establishing 
social justice. The DNT COLI mirrors the initial use of these indexes identified by Hayes 
(2011: 99): providing a scientific foundation for the resolution of problems of social order by 
stabilizing and mediating capitalist class relations. This use can surge when a country is 
relatively industrialized or in that economic path, as Argentina was in 1930s. The change in 
the COLI could be considered a step back in the history of the Argentine indicator, in terms of 
how Hayes and Tooze conceive the history of these indexes. However, it was a great step 
forward as the index was published uninterruptedly between 1935 and 2007 by the national 
statistical system, and the official Argentine price index was (relatively) trusted by society. 
Hence, the history of the Argentine COLI during the first half of the twentieth century shows 
that for a COLI to hold as stable social and political artifact, it should not only be embedded 
within the political economy; a connection between the COLI and industrial relations had to 
exist. In particular, the COLI needed to have a role in the formation of the working class as a 
visible object for policy intervention. 
 The comparison between the different national estimates neatly depicts how the cost of 
living is an intangible concept, “with several possible meanings, an ambiguity not eliminated 
by turning it into an index number” (Stapleford 2009: 183). In contrast to Argentina, the BLS 
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and the British Ministry of Labour did not need to follow ILO guidelines for their indexes to 
be legitimate, given that these countries generated much of the debate. In the 1920s and 1930s 
the legitimacy the ILO had or aimed to have regarding socio-labor statistics seems, therefore, 
to have been important only for countries with relatively weak statistical systems. 
 Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the British, French, German, and U.S. 
COLIs were subject to criticism and had problems; so did the Bunge and the DNT indexes. 
Indexes were questioned by different sectors and for different reasons. Criticisms arose both 
from labor as well as from employers, as the two were involved in wage negotiations. These 
disapprovals existed partly because no statistical agency or individual behind the estimate got 
it right and had all the answers from the beginning. It is clear that the history of these indexes 
is not one of linear progress (Lanata Briones 2016; Touchelay 2014). Why was the history of 
these national COLIs subject to progress with setbacks rather than continuous, linear 
development? Inflation can be thought, defined and quantified in different ways (Desrosières 
2014: 352). These differences are not only technical but have historical, political and 
sociological significance. Notwithstanding their aim to be rational, objective and neutral, price 
indexes as statistics and as economic knowledge had to adjust to the context and to national 
intellectual traditions to be translated into policy instruments and policy. Their trajectory was 
dependent both on statistical and theoretical developments, as well as on political, economic 
and social circumstances. For statistics to hold as stable social and political artifacts, they must 
be trusted and perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy, trust and relevance are not gained 
automatically; they are constructed, like numbers.  
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